Energy Transition and Manufacturing Performance in the U.S. Industrial Midwest

A comparative study of electricity costs, industrial emissions, employment and industrial structure in Michigan, Indiana, Illinois and Ohio

Executive view: the four states do not share one cost-emissions-employment pattern. Industrial structure, generation mix, grid conditions and realized investment timing change how transition pressures reach factories and workers.

Key findings

• Average industrial electricity prices in 2024 ranged from 7.10 cents/kWh in Ohio to 8.83 in Illinois, a spread of more than 24%. S1009
• Manufacturing represented 15.8% of nonfarm employment in Indiana, 13.1% in Michigan, 12.0% in Ohio and 9.2% in Illinois in 2025. S1088
• Direct industrial energy-related CO2 ranged from 16.528 Mt in Michigan to 41.450 Mt in Indiana in 2024. S1169
• Ohio had the highest industrial energy spending, but Indiana had the highest direct industrial CO2, so cost and carbon did not share a ranking. S1169 S1192
• In Q1 2026 total covered employment was nearly flat while average weekly wages rose 2.7%-4.1%, showing that employment and income can diverge. S1215
• The four states are best understood as four transition pathways rather than a single ranked Midwest model. S996 S997 S998 S999 S1000 S1001

Direct answer and executive conclusion

The evidence shows a real connection between energy transition and manufacturing performance, but it does not support a simple rule in which higher electricity prices automatically reduce manufacturing employment or lower emissions automatically improve income. In 2024, average industrial electricity prices ranged from 7.10 cents per kWh in Ohio to 8.83 cents in Illinois. Direct energy-related industrial CO2 ranged from 16.528 million metric tons in Michigan to 41.450 million in Indiana. Yet manufacturing represented 15.8% of nonfarm employment in Indiana and only 9.2% in Illinois in 2025. Costs, emissions and industrial dependence did not line up in the same order. [S1009][S1088][S1169]

The strongest interpretation is that industrial outcomes are mediated by industrial composition, the inherited generation fleet, wholesale-market and transmission conditions, company investment cycles, labor-market conditions and the timing of policy implementation. Illinois combines a nuclear-heavy power system and aggressive clean-power policy with the highest 2024 industrial price among the four. Indiana combines a high manufacturing share with coal exposure and the highest direct industrial CO2. Michigan combines a high manufacturing share with much lower direct industrial CO2 and an aggressive clean-power standard. Ohio combined the lowest 2024 industrial price with the largest manufacturing employment level and high direct industrial emissions. [S996][S997][S998][S999]

This report therefore treats the four states as different transition pathways rather than as a single Midwest model. Cleaner electricity does not immediately eliminate direct fuel use in industrial processes, and an announced clean-manufacturing investment does not immediately become realized employment. Conversely, a higher average power price does not imply that statewide employment must be falling at the same time. In the first quarter of 2026, total covered employment was between -0.2% and +0.3% year over year across the four states, while average weekly wages rose between 2.7% and 4.1%. [S1215]

Research scope and measurement choices

The first methodological rule is to keep statistical universes separate. EIA SEDS defines the industrial sector more broadly than manufacturing: it includes manufacturing, agriculture, construction, mining and some industrial combined heat and power or self-generation. BLS and Census manufacturing series focus on NAICS 31-33 employment, payroll, shipments and value added. Industrial direct CO2 measures fossil-fuel emissions where fuel is consumed; emissions from purchased electricity are assigned to the electric-power sector. Treating these series as interchangeable would create a definition error before any economic interpretation begins. [S1169][S1192]

The same caution applies to electricity prices. EIA industrial retail prices are averages across the industrial customers reported by utilities. A large factory may face demand charges, time-of-use rates, special contracts, market purchases or self-generation that differ substantially from the state average. This report uses the average industrial price as an indicator of the surrounding cost environment, not as a plant-specific tariff or a direct measure of profitability. That distinction becomes especially important when comparing energy-intensive plants with assembly operations. [S1009][S1089]

The time frame is also layered. Long-run context includes late-1990s electricity-market restructuring, the 2000s natural-gas buildout, the 2008-09 automotive shock, 2010s environmental and transmission rules, and 2020s battery, semiconductor and clean-manufacturing investment. The quantitative center of the report is 2022-2026, where definitions are more comparable and current conditions can be observed. The analysis does not splice pre-1997 SIC data and post-1997 NAICS data into a single seamless growth series.

Four states, four electricity systems

The 2024 generation mix alone shows why “the Midwest” is an inadequate energy category. Nuclear power was the largest generation source in Illinois, coal remained the leading source in Indiana, and natural gas led in Michigan and Ohio. Those starting points create different exposure to fuel prices, coal-plant retirement, capacity-market conditions, emissions regulation and transmission needs. The same manufacturing process can therefore face a different electricity-cost trajectory depending on where it is located, even before company-specific contracts are considered. [S996][S997][S998][S999]

Policy design is equally heterogeneous. Michigan strengthened clean- and renewable-energy standards in 2023, including an 80% clean-energy standard for 2035 and 100% for 2040. Illinois CEJA links power-sector decarbonization with transportation and workforce programs. Indiana historically used a voluntary clean-energy portfolio framework rather than the same kind of mandatory standard. Ohio’s 2008 SB 221 combined retail price regulation changes with alternative-energy and efficiency standards. A binary “strong policy/weak policy” variable would miss important differences in scope and mechanism. [S1000][S1001][S1222][S1223]

Electricity prices: lower does not mean identical industrial outcomes

Average industrial electricity prices in 2024 were 7.10 cents/kWh in Ohio, 8.15 in Indiana, 8.26 in Michigan and 8.83 in Illinois. The East North Central average was 8.08. Ohio therefore had a visible price advantage on this measure, while Illinois was above the regional benchmark. Manufacturing employment, however, did not follow the same ordering: Ohio had the largest manufacturing workforce at 677,400, but Illinois still employed 568,500 despite the higher average price. Historical supplier networks, workforce, market access, land and infrastructure clearly matter alongside electricity cost. [S1009][S1088]

The July 2026 monthly data also show that the cost environment is not fixed. Industrial prices were 11.87 cents/kWh in Illinois, 10.95 in Ohio, 9.81 in Michigan and 9.16 in Indiana. A single month should not be treated as a long-run trend because seasonal load and customer mix matter, but the increase from 2024 averages is a warning against assuming that past price rankings will persist. Transmission investment, large-load growth, generator retirement and fuel prices can all change the industrial cost envelope even if state policy is unchanged. [S1089][S1209]

A same-month comparison makes the recent divergence clearer. From July 2025 to July 2026, Illinois moved from 10.64 to 11.87¢/kWh (+11.6%), Michigan from 8.94 to 9.81 (+9.7%) and Ohio from 9.05 to 10.95 (+21.0%), while Indiana edged from 9.21 to 9.16 (-0.5%). The spread in year-over-year movement within one census division is a reason to track state tariffs, customer mix and system conditions rather than treat a regional average as the industrial cost signal. [S1089]

Energy spending and direct CO2 tell different stories

In 2024, total industrial-sector energy spending was about $8.781 billion in Ohio, $8.225 billion in Indiana, $7.818 billion in Illinois and $5.273 billion in Michigan. Direct energy-related industrial CO2 was 41.450 Mt in Indiana, 36.437 Mt in Ohio, 32.546 Mt in Illinois and 16.528 Mt in Michigan. The state with the highest spending was not the state with the highest direct emissions. Michigan, despite a large manufacturing role, had by far the lowest direct industrial CO2 total among the four. Fuel mix and industry mix clearly mediate the relationship between dollars and carbon. [S1169][S1192]

That distinction matters because direct industrial CO2 excludes the emissions associated with purchased electricity. A plant can reduce onsite fuel combustion by electrifying a process while increasing electricity consumption. Whether total emissions fall then depends on the grid mix and the plant’s procurement. Conversely, a state may show lower direct industrial emissions even when its factories purchase carbon-intensive power. For that reason, this report keeps direct fuel emissions and the electricity-cost environment separate rather than producing a single composite carbon-cost score.

Manufacturing jobs and wages sit inside a much larger labor market

Average manufacturing employment in 2025 was 677,400 in Ohio, 585,900 in Michigan, 568,500 in Illinois and 517,300 in Indiana. The manufacturing share of total nonfarm employment tells a different story: 15.8% in Indiana, 13.1% in Michigan, 12.0% in Ohio and 9.2% in Illinois. A common plant closure or hiring boom therefore has different regional significance depending on whether the state is deeply manufacturing-dependent or has a broader service-sector base. [S1088]

Statewide labor data reinforce the need for caution. In the first quarter of 2026, covered employment growth was 0.0% in Illinois, -0.1% in Indiana, +0.3% in Michigan and -0.2% in Ohio. Average weekly wages nevertheless increased by 4.1%, 2.7%, 3.9% and 4.0%, respectively. Employment can stagnate while wages rise because of labor scarcity, productivity, inflation, industry mix and bargaining conditions. An energy-policy narrative alone cannot explain that combination. [S1215]

Gross job flows are larger than the net changes usually discussed. In the fourth quarter of 2025, private-sector gross job gains and losses were each measured in the hundreds of thousands in these states, while the net difference was only +1,193 in Illinois, +10,536 in Indiana, +10,651 in Michigan and +14,547 in Ohio. Announced jobs at a new factory should not be simply netted against layoffs elsewhere without matching timing, occupation and industry. Realized transition employment needs to be measured after operations begin. [S1214]

Illinois: cleaner generation and a higher industrial price can coexist

Illinois starts from a distinctive electricity base because nuclear power is its leading generation source. That helps explain a lower-carbon generation profile than a coal-heavy system, but it did not produce the lowest industrial electricity price. Illinois posted the highest 2024 industrial average among the four at 8.83 cents/kWh, and the July 2026 figure reached 11.87 cents/kWh. The result is a useful counterexample to the claim that a lower-carbon grid automatically delivers lower industrial power prices. Grid charges, capacity, transmission, plant economics and customer mix also shape the bill. [S998][S1009][S1089]

Manufacturing accounted for only 9.2% of Illinois nonfarm employment, the lowest share in this comparison, yet the absolute manufacturing workforce still exceeded 568,000. CEJA combines power-sector decarbonization with workforce and transportation measures, while state manufacturing incentives have expanded. For Illinois, the practical question is whether higher near-term electricity and grid costs are offset by reliability, cleaner procurement options and the ability to attract higher-value manufacturing. A one-year price comparison cannot answer that question by itself. [S1001]

Indiana: high manufacturing dependence and a difficult emissions baseline

Indiana had the highest manufacturing employment share at 15.8% in 2025. Its 2024 industrial electricity price, 8.15 cents/kWh, was relatively low, but direct industrial energy-related CO2 was the highest of the four at 41.450 Mt and industrial energy use was also the largest at roughly 1,177.4 trillion Btu. The state therefore faces a demanding transition problem: preserve the economics of an industry-heavy economy while reducing coal exposure and direct process-fuel emissions. [S997][S1009][S1169]

Indiana’s policy path has historically differed from its neighbors because its clean-energy portfolio framework was voluntary. More recently, semiconductor packaging, battery-electric-vehicle investment and the Mitchell cement carbon-capture demonstration have introduced new demand and new decarbonization options. The cement project targets at least 95% capture, but it remains a project target rather than a realized statewide outcome. Indiana will need grid capacity for new electric loads while also addressing direct industrial emissions that cannot be solved by cleaner electricity alone. [S1222][S1211][S1050]

Michigan: lower direct emissions, stronger clean-power rules and industrial reinvestment

Michigan combined a high manufacturing employment share, 13.1%, with the lowest direct industrial CO2 total in this four-state comparison at 16.528 Mt. Industrial energy use was also much lower, about 622.4 trillion Btu. Those numbers do not prove superior efficiency because the industrial mix differs, but they demonstrate why manufacturing scale cannot be inferred from energy or emissions totals alone. Natural gas was the largest generation source in 2024, while 2023 legislation set an 80% clean-energy standard for 2035 and 100% for 2040. [S996][S1000][S1169]

Michigan has also pursued battery, electric-vehicle and semiconductor-material investment. The historical record, however, warns against equating public support with immediate production. A 2013 DOE Inspector General report found that the LG Chem battery project in Holland had received substantial Recovery Act support but had not met planned production objectives at the time of the review. The correct test for newer projects is therefore commercial operation, payroll, output and energy use after startup, not the size of the announced subsidy or construction budget. [S1227][S1051]

Ohio: large manufacturing scale and a price advantage that may not be permanent

Ohio had the lowest 2024 industrial electricity price, 7.10 cents/kWh, and the largest manufacturing employment level, 677,400. At the same time, direct industrial CO2 was high at 36.437 Mt, and natural gas was the state’s leading generation source. The combination provides an important baseline: relatively low electricity cost can coexist with a large manufacturing base and a high decarbonization requirement. [S999][S1009][S1088][S1169]

Ohio’s policy history includes SB 221, which combined electricity-pricing changes with alternative-energy, efficiency and emissions provisions. More recent industrial projects include hydrogen-ready steel and electric-melting concepts and battery investment. By July 2026, however, the average industrial power price had risen to 10.95 cents/kWh. The state’s historical price advantage should therefore be treated as a changing market condition rather than a permanent structural entitlement. [S1223][S1089]

How policy and markets transmit into industrial outcomes

The first transmission mechanism is the grid. Electrifying industrial heat or adding new clean-manufacturing facilities requires generation, transmission, substations and interconnection capacity. FERC Order 1920 and its rehearing orders require longer-term regional planning and cost-allocation processes. Better planning can improve access and reliability, but the industrial price effect depends on which projects are selected, how costs are allocated and how quickly the facilities enter service. The rule is therefore a mechanism, not a prediction of lower or higher prices. [S1209]

The second mechanism is industrial policy. Section 45X supports domestic production of batteries and other clean-energy components, while CHIPS awards are supporting advanced packaging in Indiana and semiconductor-grade polysilicon in Michigan. These investments can add manufacturing jobs and regional income, but they can also increase electricity demand. A successful energy transition can therefore coincide with higher total industrial electricity use if output grows faster than efficiency improves. The relevant productivity question is energy and carbon per unit of value added, not total consumption alone. [S1002][S1050][S1051]

The third mechanism is process decarbonization. The Midwest Hydrogen Hub includes Illinois, Indiana and Michigan in plans for hydrogen use across steel, glass, refining, manufacturing and transport. The Mitchell cement demonstration targets at least 95% CO2 capture. Such projects address emissions that a cleaner grid cannot remove by itself. Yet award amounts, planned capture rates and projected reductions are not realized outcomes. Evaluation must distinguish award, construction, commissioning and operational performance. [S1210][S1211]

Counterevidence and alternative explanations

A correlation between electricity prices and employment would still be insufficient evidence of causation. Automotive cycles, interest rates, exports, tariffs, automation, strikes, model changeovers and inventory adjustments can move production and employment independently of energy policy. Michigan and Indiana are especially exposed to vehicle and parts cycles, while Ohio and Illinois have different mixes of metals, machinery, chemicals and logistics. Energy cost matters, but its share of total cost differs dramatically across manufacturing industries. [S1192]

State averages also hide firm heterogeneity. Smelters, chemical plants and cement kilns are far more energy-sensitive than final assembly. Large customers can negotiate contracts, manage peak demand or self-generate. A low statewide average price may still be accompanied by long interconnection queues or reliability constraints that deter investment. For this reason, the analysis keeps four dimensions visible: electricity cost, manufacturing dependence, direct industrial emissions and the generation-policy context.

The same discipline applies to public investment announcements. The LG Chem case demonstrates that a funded project can miss early production milestones; other projects may outperform early forecasts. WARN notices and announced job targets should not be mechanically added and subtracted because they refer to different industries, occupations and dates. A credible employment evaluation begins after commercial operation and follows QCEW or CES payroll employment over time. [S1227][S1214]

Four transition pathways: a comparative synthesis

Taken together, the indicators define four pathways rather than a ranking. Illinois is a “cleaner power base, higher industrial price” case. Indiana is a “high manufacturing dependence, high direct emissions, relatively low price” case. Michigan is a “high manufacturing dependence, lower direct emissions, stronger clean-power rules and advanced-manufacturing reinvestment” case. Ohio is a “large manufacturing base, historically low price, high direct emissions and fast recent price increase” case. These labels describe constraints and mechanisms; they do not declare a winner.

The synthesis also shows why a single transition score would be misleading. Ohio had the highest industrial energy spending in 2024 but lower direct CO2 than Indiana. Michigan combined a high manufacturing share with the lowest direct industrial CO2. Illinois had the cleanest generation advantage from nuclear power but the highest 2024 industrial price in the group. Compressing these dimensions into one index would erase precisely the trade-offs that businesses and policymakers need to see.

For an electricity-intensive producer, the most relevant question is the long-run combination of power price, contract availability, interconnection time and grid investment. For battery or automotive production, workforce, supply chains and tax-credit or demand-policy changes can matter more. For cement and steel, process fuels, hydrogen and carbon capture may dominate. The practical use of the four-pathway framework is to match an industry’s cost and carbon profile to the state-specific transition constraints rather than to rank states on a universal scale.

2026-2028 scenarios and practical implications

One plausible scenario is sustained price pressure from load growth and grid investment. Data centers, battery plants, semiconductor facilities and electrified industrial processes may expand at the same time. Even with new clean generation, interconnection and capacity costs can rise. Under this scenario, manufacturers should evaluate long-term contracts, peak-demand management, storage, on-site resources and expected interconnection timelines instead of relying on the latest statewide average price. [S1209]

A second scenario is a successful clean-manufacturing expansion in which regional output and jobs rise while total electricity use also increases. That outcome should not automatically be classified as an energy-transition failure. If production expands faster than energy use, energy intensity can improve even as total consumption rises. Conversely, large subsidy announcements with delayed startup can produce little near-term employment. The correct scoreboard is realized output, payroll, energy intensity and carbon intensity after commercial operation. [S1002][S1050][S1051]

A third scenario is policy repricing. Federal tax credits and environmental rules changed materially in 2025-2026, so projects at different stages can face different economics. A plant already under construction is not exposed in the same way as a project that has only been announced. Firms and local governments should therefore track technology-specific credit dates, construction start, power-procurement commitments and state incentives rather than treating federal policy as one stable variable.

A practical monitoring framework

Turning this analysis into a decision tool requires indicators at different frequencies rather than waiting for annual statistics. Monthly monitoring should cover industrial electricity prices and sales, major fuel prices and generator additions or retirements. Quarterly monitoring should cover manufacturing employment and wages, business openings and contractions, and whether major projects have moved from construction into operation. Annual updates should reconnect SEDS industrial energy use, spending and direct CO2 with AIES or Economic Census measures of manufacturing shipments, value added and purchased electricity. That cadence separates short-run price shocks from structural industrial change. [S1089][S1215][S1192]

At the firm level, four variables are more informative than a single electricity price: the actual contract and demand-charge structure, the time required for interconnection and expansion, direct process-fuel use and electrification potential, and energy use per unit of output or value added. Keeping those items separate distinguishes a plant that absorbs a higher tariff through efficiency gains from a project that faces a low average state price but cannot obtain timely grid capacity.

Policy performance should be tracked with the same discipline. Award values, maximum tax credits, announced jobs and projected CO2 reductions are leading indicators; realized payroll, production, electricity use and emissions are outcomes. Recording projects through announcement, award, construction, commissioning and commercial operation makes the lag between policy and economic results visible. Over time, that system can turn the four-pathway framework in this report into a repeatable monitoring tool rather than a one-time description. [S1002][S1210][S1211]

Limits, what is known, and the final answer

What is known with confidence is that the four states follow different transition paths and that electricity cost, direct industrial CO2 and manufacturing employment do not share a common ranking. In 2024, industrial power prices ranged from 7.10 to 8.83 cents/kWh; direct industrial CO2 ranged from 16.528 to 41.450 Mt; and in 2025 manufacturing represented 9.2% to 15.8% of nonfarm employment. Those ranges alone are enough to reject a single undifferentiated Industrial Midwest model. [S1009][S1088][S1169]

What remains conditional is the causal direction between prices and jobs. Higher power prices are a burden for energy-intensive production, but they may also reflect grid investment, reliability spending or rapid growth in high-value loads. Manufacturing employment can move differently from output because of automation and productivity. Estimating a net policy effect requires matched industry panels, plant operating dates, actual tariffs and realized investment rather than statewide averages alone.

What cannot yet be answered precisely is how many net manufacturing jobs any single energy policy created or destroyed, or exactly how much grid decarbonization changed a specific plant’s total cost. The available official data use different geographic and industrial units, and investment announcements precede operation by months or years. These limitations narrow the claim; they do not erase the clear comparative pattern.

The final answer is therefore that energy transition is related to employment, income and industrial restructuring in the Industrial Midwest, but the relationship is mediated rather than mechanical. Existing manufacturing concentration, generation mix, direct fuel use, grid conditions, policy design and realized investment determine whether a given energy change appears as a cost shock, a productivity gain, a new investment opportunity or some combination of the three. Decision-makers should track those dimensions separately and recombine them at the industry level instead of assuming that one energy indicator can stand in for industrial performance.

Sources and method

Numeric comparisons are made within consistent statistical definitions; industrial-sector, manufacturing and electric-power emissions are kept separate where their universes differ.

1. S1009 — 2024 Total Electric Industry—Average Retail Price by Sector and State. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/sales_revenue_price/pdf/table_4.pdf
2. S1089 — Electric Power Monthly Table 5.6.A — Average Price of Electricity by State, July 2026. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.php?t=epmt_5_6_a
3. S1088 — Employees on nonfarm payrolls in states by major industry — annual averages 2025. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/sae/tables/annual-average/table-1-employees-on-nonfarm-payrolls-in-states-and-selected-areas-by-major-industry.htm
4. S1215 — QCEW Table 3 — Covered establishments, employment, and wages by state, first quarter 2026. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cewqtr.t03.htm
5. S1214 — Business Employment Dynamics Table 6 — Private-sector gross job gains and losses by state, fourth quarter 2025. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cewbd.t06.htm
6. S996 — Michigan Electricity Profile 2024. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/michigan/
7. S997 — Indiana Electricity Profile 2024. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/Indiana/
8. S998 — Illinois Electricity Profile 2024. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/illinois/
9. S999 — Ohio Electricity Profile 2024. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/Ohio/
10. S1169 — State Carbon Dioxide Emissions Data. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/?os=app
11. S1192 — AIES31BASIC01 — Manufacturing: Summary Statistics for Industry Groups and Industries for Employer Firms in the U.S. and States: 2024. U.S. Census Bureau. https://data.census.gov/table/AIESBASIC2024.AIES31BASIC01
12. S1000 — 2023 Energy Legislation. Michigan Public Service Commission. https://www.michigan.gov/mpsc/commission/workgroups/2023-energy-legislation
13. S1001 — Climate and Equitable Jobs Act (CEJA). Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. https://epa.illinois.gov/topics/ceja.html
14. S1222 — Voluntary Clean Energy Standards. Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor. https://www.in.gov/oucc/electric/key-cases-by-utility/voluntary-clean-energy-standards/
15. S1223 — Senate Bill 221 — State energy policy revisions. Ohio General Assembly. https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/127/sb221
16. S1209 — Order No. 1920, 1920-A and 1920-B — Long-Term Regional Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. https://www.ferc.gov/explainer-transmission-planning-and-cost-allocation-final-rule
17. S1210 — Midwest Hydrogen Hub Phase 1 Award. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations. https://www.energy.gov/cmei/oced/articles/award-wednesdays-november-20-2024
18. S1211 — Mitchell Cement Plant Decarbonization Project — Phase 1 Award. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations. https://www.energy.gov/cmei/oced/articles/award-wednesdays-august-14-2024
19. S1227 — Special Report OAS-RA-13-10 — DOE’s Management of the $150 Million Recovery Act Grant to LG Chem Michigan. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. https://www.energy.gov/ig/articles/special-report-oas-ra-13-10
20. S1002 — Final Rules for Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit (Section 45X). U.S. Department of the Treasury. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2671
21. S1050 — CHIPS Incentives Award with SK hynix for advanced packaging in Indiana. U.S. Department of Commerce. https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2024/12/biden-harris-administration-announces-chips-incentives-award-sk-hynix
22. S1051 — CHIPS Incentives Award with Hemlock Semiconductor in Michigan. U.S. Department of Commerce. https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2025/01/department-commerce-announces-chips-incentives-award-hemlock
23. S1218 — Form EIA-923 Detailed Data — Generation, Fuel Consumption, Stocks, Receipts and Environmental Data. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia923/index.php
24. S1031 — SEDS Table E5—Industrial sector energy price estimates, 2024. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/state/seds/data.php?incfile=%2Fstate%2Fseds%2Fsep_sum%2Fhtml%2Fsum_pr_ind.html&sid=MI