Why Mexico and Brazil Followed Different Growth Paths

Mexico and Brazil’s recent growth gap cannot be explained by export performance alone. Mexico’s exports reached roughly US$665 billion in 2025 and 83% went to the United States, yet the IMF projected only 1.0% growth as domestic activity weakened. Brazil expanded 2.3% in real terms, while low unemployment and rising real earnings helped household demand. The two economies face the same world economy, but external shocks enter through different doors and their domestic sectors absorb those shocks differently. [30] [2] [5] [28]

Over the longer run, Mexico became more deeply embedded in North American manufacturing while Brazil retained a combination of competitive agriculture and mining with a large domestic market. That does not make Mexico simply a manufacturing economy and Brazil simply a commodity economy. Mexican outcomes also depend on rates, fiscal policy and infrastructure; Brazilian outcomes also depend on labor income, services and monetary conditions. Their growth paths are the result of several channels operating at once. [13] [14] [15] [21]

Key findings: six results that explain the divergence

Brazil recorded 2.3% real GDP growth in 2025 and 11.7% agricultural growth, while the IMF projected only 1.0% growth for Mexico amid weak domestic activity. The recent divergence cannot be read from export performance alone. This finding reinforces the need to avoid a single-variable explanation. Read with the definition and timing of the statistic, it shows how a long-run structure and a short-run shock can generate the same headline divergence. [2] [5]

Mexico exported about US$665B in 2025, up 7.6%, and 83% went to the United States. Manufacturing exports rose 10%, combining a powerful North American production advantage with unusually concentrated exposure to U.S. demand and trade policy. This finding reinforces the need to avoid a single-variable explanation. Read with the definition and timing of the statistic, it shows how a long-run structure and a short-run shock can generate the same headline divergence. [30] [33]

Brazil’s 2025 unemployment rate averaged 5.6% while real usual earnings increased 5.7%. That labor-income support helped household demand remain a meaningful growth engine even as interest rates stayed restrictive. This finding reinforces the need to avoid a single-variable explanation. Read with the definition and timing of the statistic, it shows how a long-run structure and a short-run shock can generate the same headline divergence. [28] [29]

Mexico’s manufacturing integration predates the current nearshoring cycle: NAFTA began in 1994 and USMCA replaced it in 2020. Treating all recent export gains as new nearshoring would overstate the contribution of fresh relocation investment. This finding reinforces the need to avoid a single-variable explanation. Read with the definition and timing of the statistic, it shows how a long-run structure and a short-run shock can generate the same headline divergence. [13] [14] [19]

External debt and FDI are not interchangeable measures. Mexico ended 2025 with about US$645.7B in gross external debt, while Brazil’s 2024 inward direct-investment position was US$504.0B; the first is debt exposure and the second includes long-term equity and intercompany finance. This finding reinforces the need to avoid a single-variable explanation. Read with the definition and timing of the statistic, it shows how a long-run structure and a short-run shock can generate the same headline divergence. [34] [4] [23] [25]

The common shorthand—Brazil as a commodity economy and Mexico as a manufacturing economy—misses important buffers. Brazil has a large service and domestic-demand base, while Mexico’s outcomes also depend on domestic consumption, monetary conditions, infrastructure and policy execution. This finding reinforces the need to avoid a single-variable explanation. Read with the definition and timing of the statistic, it shows how a long-run structure and a short-run shock can generate the same headline divergence. [15] [21] [20] [42]

Research question and comparison scope

The first step is to separate the growth rate from the composition of growth. Two economies can both expand by roughly two percent while relying on entirely different engines—export orders, agricultural prices, real wages, public demand or fixed investment—and those engines imply different persistence. The analysis uses the trade and production structures built since 2000 as the background, then relies on the richer official evidence from 2024-2026 to see how those structures translated into recent outcomes. [17] [22] [23] [24]

The scope covers GDP and sector composition, inflation and monetary policy, household demand and labor markets, merchandise trade, FDI and external debt, and the major industrial-policy changes now under way. Concepts that are not comparable, such as gross external debt and direct-investment positions, are kept separate. Forecasts are labeled as forecasts rather than mixed with realized data, and the report uses counterevidence whenever the evidence cannot isolate a clean causal effect for nearshoring or the commodity cycle. [23] [24] [25] [19]

Why the two growth paths diverged most clearly in 2025

The recent gap did not arise because Mexico stopped exporting; it arose because export strength and domestic growth stopped moving in the same direction. IBGE reported 2.3% real GDP growth for Brazil in 2025, with agriculture up 11.7%, industry 1.4% and services 1.8%. The IMF projected only 1.0% growth for Mexico in 2025 and highlighted fiscal consolidation, still-tight monetary conditions and uncertainty around U.S. trade policy. Taken together, Brazil had a stronger domestic cushion through agriculture, labor income and household demand, while Mexico combined strong external sales with weaker internal momentum. The analytical question is therefore not simply which economy performed better, but which channel produced the growth and how persistent that channel is likely to be. A change generated by production, labor income, consumption, investment or external demand can look similar in headline GDP while carrying very different implications. [2] [5]

Brazil’s number is an ex-post national-accounts result whereas Mexico’s figure is an IMF projection, so they should not be presented as perfectly symmetric observations. Even with that statistical distinction, the direction of the evidence is clear: exports alone cannot explain the latest growth gap. This distinction also prevents a long-run structural story from being mixed with a one-year cyclical result. Trade architecture and industrial specialization change slowly, whereas interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and fiscal decisions can move growth quickly. The sections below separate those layers first and then reconnect them in the final assessment. [6]

Long-run structure: North American manufacturing versus a broader Brazilian demand base

The roots of the divergence predate today’s policy packages and lie in production and trade structures built over decades. Mexico became deeply embedded in North American manufacturing after NAFTA began in 1994, and USMCA carried that institutional architecture forward from 2020. The WTO notes that manufactures account for more than 85% of Mexico’s merchandise trade, while Brazil combines globally competitive agriculture and mining with a large domestic service and consumption base. Taken together, That contrast helps explain why the same global shock can arrive through U.S. factory orders in Mexico but through commodity prices and domestic demand in Brazil. The analytical question is therefore not simply which economy performed better, but which channel produced the growth and how persistent that channel is likely to be. A change generated by production, labor income, consumption, investment or external demand can look similar in headline GDP while carrying very different implications. [13] [14]

Mexico also has a large internal market and Brazil has substantial manufacturing, so a simple manufacturing-versus-commodities label is too crude. The useful long-run distinction is how external demand is transmitted and how much domestic demand can absorb the shock. This distinction also prevents a long-run structural story from being mixed with a one-year cyclical result. Trade architecture and industrial specialization change slowly, whereas interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and fiscal decisions can move growth quickly. The sections below separate those layers first and then reconnect them in the final assessment. [15]

Mexico: record exports do not equal record nearshoring

Mexico’s 2025 export performance was genuinely strong, but treating the entire increase as new nearshoring would overstate what the evidence can support. The Economy Ministry reported roughly US$665 billion in exports, up 7.6%, with the United States taking 83% and manufacturing exports rising 10%. The BIS finds clear corporate interest and manufacturing strength but a mixed economy-wide signal in FDI and manufacturing employment. Taken together, Legacy NAFTA-USMCA supply chains, the U.S. business cycle, exchange rates, post-pandemic inventory shifts and new plant relocation all overlap in the same data. The analytical question is therefore not simply which economy performed better, but which channel produced the growth and how persistent that channel is likely to be. A change generated by production, labor income, consumption, investment or external demand can look similar in headline GDP while carrying very different implications. [30] [33]

At the firm or state level, relocation effects can still be powerful, so the evidence does not justify dismissing nearshoring either. The practical test is whether announced projects become fixed investment, jobs and additional productive capacity rather than remaining plans or financial flows. This distinction also prevents a long-run structural story from being mixed with a one-year cyclical result. Trade architecture and industrial specialization change slowly, whereas interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and fiscal decisions can move growth quickly. The sections below separate those layers first and then reconnect them in the final assessment. [19]

Brazil: why domestic demand held up despite high rates

Brazil’s 2025 growth was supported not only by commodities but also by a labor-income channel that gave domestic demand a meaningful cushion. IBGE reported average unemployment of 5.6% and a 5.7% rise in real usual earnings, while the national accounts showed household consumption up 1.3%. At the same time, the central bank kept monetary conditions restrictive because inflation pressure remained elevated, so the demand support did not come from cheap credit. Taken together, Employment and income gains offset part of the financing drag, while 11.7% agricultural growth added another source of production and income. The analytical question is therefore not simply which economy performed better, but which channel produced the growth and how persistent that channel is likely to be. A change generated by production, labor income, consumption, investment or external demand can look similar in headline GDP while carrying very different implications. [28] [29]

Average earnings can move with employment composition and informality remains high, so the improvement was not uniform across households. A commodity-only account of Brazil therefore misses an important labor and consumption mechanism. This distinction also prevents a long-run structural story from being mixed with a one-year cyclical result. Trade architecture and industrial specialization change slowly, whereas interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and fiscal decisions can move growth quickly. The sections below separate those layers first and then reconnect them in the final assessment. [2]

Inflation and interest rates: ‘tight policy’ is not one common condition

Both economies faced inflation and high interest rates, but the timing of policy changes and the transmission to domestic demand were different. Banco de México cut rates repeatedly through 2025, reaching 7.00% in December and 6.50% during 2026. Brazil remained in a more restrictive setting as strong demand, food prices and currency depreciation kept inflation pressure elevated. Taken together, Comparing policy rates alone can misread conditions because real rates, inflation expectations, credit structures and fiscal settings differ. The analytical question is therefore not simply which economy performed better, but which channel produced the growth and how persistent that channel is likely to be. A change generated by production, labor income, consumption, investment or external demand can look similar in headline GDP while carrying very different implications. [6] [26]

A rate cut also does not produce an immediate rebound in spending or capital expenditure; monetary transmission has long and uneven lags. Growth comparisons therefore need the direction of rates together with real wages, credit, fiscal policy and external uncertainty. This distinction also prevents a long-run structural story from being mixed with a one-year cyclical result. Trade architecture and industrial specialization change slowly, whereas interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and fiscal decisions can move growth quickly. The sections below separate those layers first and then reconnect them in the final assessment. [29] [41]

Investment and FDI: announcements, capital flows and new factories are different numbers

Both countries advertise large investment programs, but announced portfolios, productive capital spending and balance-of-payments FDI are not the same thing. Plan México presented roughly 2,000 projects worth about US$277 billion and was followed by measures to speed approvals and trade procedures. Brazil is pursuing Nova Indústria Brasil while its central bank reported a US$504 billion inward direct-investment position for 2024. Taken together, FDI can include equity, reinvested earnings, intercompany lending and mergers, so it does not measure factory construction one-for-one. The analytical question is therefore not simply which economy performed better, but which channel produced the growth and how persistent that channel is likely to be. A change generated by production, labor income, consumption, investment or external demand can look similar in headline GDP while carrying very different implications. [4] [8] [9]

To judge whether policy mobilized productive investment, announced values should be checked against fixed capital formation, construction, production and employment after implementation. Nearshoring and industrial policy are best evaluated by the form and realization of investment, not by the label attached to a capital flow. This distinction also prevents a long-run structural story from being mixed with a one-year cyclical result. Trade architecture and industrial specialization change slowly, whereas interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and fiscal decisions can move growth quickly. The sections below separate those layers first and then reconnect them in the final assessment. [10] [12]

External debt and capital flows: structure matters more than the headline

The most common analytical mistake in debt comparisons is to treat a large gross total as direct evidence of high vulnerability. Mexico ended 2025 with about US$645.7 billion in gross external debt, equal to 35.1% of GDP, and a net international investment position of minus US$638.5 billion. Brazil’s central bank applies international definitions that include intercompany liabilities and nonresident holdings of domestic securities, and in 2026 it revised past public-private classifications. Taken together, Actual external risk depends on sector, residual maturity, currency, financing terms, reserve assets and export capacity. The analytical question is therefore not simply which economy performed better, but which channel produced the growth and how persistent that channel is likely to be. A change generated by production, labor income, consumption, investment or external demand can look similar in headline GDP while carrying very different implications. [3] [34] [35] [36]

Putting Mexican and Brazilian headline numbers into a ranking without confirming identical coverage can turn statistical conventions and revisions into a false economic conclusion. Gross debt is therefore a starting point; maturity and balance-sheet structure are closer to the underlying risk. This distinction also prevents a long-run structural story from being mixed with a one-year cyclical result. Trade architecture and industrial specialization change slowly, whereas interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and fiscal decisions can move growth quickly. The sections below separate those layers first and then reconnect them in the final assessment. [37] [23] [24]

Trade geography and external shocks: the United States and China play different roles

Both economies are deeply connected to world trade, but different partners and product mixes mean that the same global shock can produce different growth responses. In 2025, 83% of Mexico’s exports went to the United States, while trade with China remains heavily import-oriented. Brazil’s official trade system separates agriculture, extractive industries and manufacturing, making Chinese demand and commodity prices especially relevant to export values and the terms of trade. Taken together, A U.S. manufacturing slowdown or tariff change can pass quickly into Mexican orders and production, whereas Chinese growth and iron-ore or agricultural prices can matter more for Brazil. The analytical question is therefore not simply which economy performed better, but which channel produced the growth and how persistent that channel is likely to be. A change generated by production, labor income, consumption, investment or external demand can look similar in headline GDP while carrying very different implications. [30] [31] [32]

Brazil also trades manufactures with the United States and Mexico exports oil and agricultural products, so the distinction is relative rather than absolute. The useful comparison separates partner, product, price and volume instead of relying on total exports alone. This distinction also prevents a long-run structural story from being mixed with a one-year cyclical result. Trade architecture and industrial specialization change slowly, whereas interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and fiscal decisions can move growth quickly. The sections below separate those layers first and then reconnect them in the final assessment. [18] [39] [40]

Industrial policy and tax reform: execution matters more than announcements

Both governments are using investment and industrial policy to raise potential growth, but the economic payoff appears after implementation rather than on the announcement date. Plan México combines a large investment portfolio with faster approvals and trade procedures to deepen supply chains and industrial clusters. Brazil is advancing Nova Indústria Brasil while phasing in a broad consumption-tax reform around IBS, CBS and a selective tax. Taken together, Mexico is emphasizing investment attraction and North American supply chains; Brazil is targeting industrial productivity and the high transaction cost of a complex indirect-tax system. The analytical question is therefore not simply which economy performed better, but which channel produced the growth and how persistent that channel is likely to be. A change generated by production, labor income, consumption, investment or external demand can look similar in headline GDP while carrying very different implications. [9] [10]

An investment portfolio is not executed spending, and tax reform can create transition costs and sector-specific winners and losers before long-run gains appear. The proper test is realized capital formation, productivity, job quality and export diversification rather than the size of policy announcements. This distinction also prevents a long-run structural story from being mixed with a one-year cyclical result. Trade architecture and industrial specialization change slowly, whereas interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and fiscal decisions can move growth quickly. The sections below separate those layers first and then reconnect them in the final assessment. [11] [12]

A shared constraint: weak productivity and investment

Focusing only on the differences between Mexico and Brazil can hide a constraint they share with much of Latin America: slow productivity growth and insufficient investment. The OECD, ECLAC and partners estimate labor-productivity growth of only 0.9% a year across the region in 1991-2024, below the OECD’s 1.2%. The World Bank also identifies high borrowing costs, weak investment and uncertain external demand as persistent regional constraints. Taken together, Mexico can export more without spreading productivity gains widely across firms and regions, while Brazil’s large internal market can still coexist with low investment and fiscal constraints. The analytical question is therefore not simply which economy performed better, but which channel produced the growth and how persistent that channel is likely to be. A change generated by production, labor income, consumption, investment or external demand can look similar in headline GDP while carrying very different implications. [16] [7]

Regional averages conceal large differences in institutions and sector composition and cannot replace country analysis. Over the long run, productivity, capital formation, infrastructure and policy execution matter more than a simple label about export specialization. This distinction also prevents a long-run structural story from being mixed with a one-year cyclical result. Trade architecture and industrial specialization change slowly, whereas interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and fiscal decisions can move growth quickly. The sections below separate those layers first and then reconnect them in the final assessment. [18]

Counterevidence and alternative interpretations

The two most attractive narratives—Mexico as a nearshoring winner and Brazil as a commodity winner—do not by themselves fit the full evidence. The BIS finds a mixed economy-wide signal for Mexican nearshoring in FDI and manufacturing jobs, while the OECD points to electricity, water, logistics, rule-of-law and productivity constraints. The IMF describes Brazil as resilient to multiple shocks, suggesting that domestic demand and policy responses mattered alongside commodity exposure. Taken together, The purpose of this counterevidence is not to discard the main narratives but to define where they work and where they stop explaining the data. The analytical question is therefore not simply which economy performed better, but which channel produced the growth and how persistent that channel is likely to be. A change generated by production, labor income, consumption, investment or external demand can look similar in headline GDP while carrying very different implications. [19] [20]

Nearshoring and commodities remain important channels and may dominate in specific states, sectors or episodes. A robust conclusion therefore needs several transmission mechanisms rather than one sweeping story. This distinction also prevents a long-run structural story from being mixed with a one-year cyclical result. Trade architecture and industrial specialization change slowly, whereas interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and fiscal decisions can move growth quickly. The sections below separate those layers first and then reconnect them in the final assessment. [21] [42]

Definitions and methods that prevent false comparisons

The central methodological rule is to keep trade, external debt, FDI, the international investment position and announced investment as separate concepts. The IMF’s EDS Guide and BPM6 distinguish debt, direct investment, portfolio flows and reserve assets, while the OECD separately defines the lasting-interest relationship behind FDI. Mexico’s merchandise statistics follow international trade concepts, and Brazil’s external-debt series was revised in 2026, illustrating why coverage and data vintage matter. Taken together, Whenever indicators appear in the same table, currency, reference date, nominal-versus-real status and stock-versus-flow need to be explicit. The analytical question is therefore not simply which economy performed better, but which channel produced the growth and how persistent that channel is likely to be. A change generated by production, labor income, consumption, investment or external demand can look similar in headline GDP while carrying very different implications. [22] [23] [24]

One dollar of debt and one dollar of FDI do not carry the same economic meaning simply because both are denominated in dollars. Definitions and denominators should be aligned before the size of the numbers is interpreted. This distinction also prevents a long-run structural story from being mixed with a one-year cyclical result. Trade architecture and industrial specialization change slowly, whereas interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and fiscal decisions can move growth quickly. The sections below separate those layers first and then reconnect them in the final assessment. [25] [37]

Scenarios and practical implications

The next phase of the gap will depend on the combination of U.S. demand, China and commodity prices, interest rates, fiscal choices and the execution of industrial policy. Mexico’s concentration in U.S. manufacturing means that a weaker U.S. cycle or new trade barriers could amplify the downside from its otherwise successful export platform. Brazil remains sensitive to China and commodities, but a strong labor market and domestic demand can cushion part of an external slowdown if they persist. Taken together, The comparison can also change quickly if new Mexican investment raises productivity or if Brazilian tax reform lowers transaction costs and unlocks capital spending. The analytical question is therefore not simply which economy performed better, but which channel produced the growth and how persistent that channel is likely to be. A change generated by production, labor income, consumption, investment or external demand can look similar in headline GDP while carrying very different implications. [39] [40] [41]

These are conditional paths rather than point forecasts and should not be read as promised growth rates. Businesses and policymakers should monitor realized investment, real wages, external demand, the real exchange rate and balance-sheet structure alongside headline GDP. This distinction also prevents a long-run structural story from being mixed with a one-year cyclical result. Trade architecture and industrial specialization change slowly, whereas interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and fiscal decisions can move growth quickly. The sections below separate those layers first and then reconnect them in the final assessment. [42] [30] [28]

Limits of the analysis

The evidence is strong enough to identify structural differences in the two growth models, but not to assign a single causal percentage to nearshoring or the commodity cycle. The IMF WEO provides long comparable series but mixes historical data with forecasts, and national sources use different revision calendars and classifications. Brazil’s 2026 revision of past public-private external-debt classifications shows how a new vintage can change the interpretation of earlier sector shares. Taken together, A causal estimate would require matched industry and regional investment, employment, real exchange rates, detailed trade and productivity at a common frequency. The analytical question is therefore not simply which economy performed better, but which channel produced the growth and how persistent that channel is likely to be. A change generated by production, labor income, consumption, investment or external demand can look similar in headline GDP while carrying very different implications. [17] [23]

The analysis therefore connects observed structures and verified recent numbers rather than reporting econometric causal coefficients. It can identify which channels are more plausible, but the exact GDP contribution of each channel remains open. This distinction also prevents a long-run structural story from being mixed with a one-year cyclical result. Trade architecture and industrial specialization change slowly, whereas interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and fiscal decisions can move growth quickly. The sections below separate those layers first and then reconnect them in the final assessment. [24] [37]

New analytical result: two axes of external exposure and domestic cushioning

The comparison places external-market concentration on one axis and domestic-demand cushioning capacity on the other, using official trade, national accounts, labor-market and external-sector evidence. The positions are qualitative and do not create an arbitrary composite score or ranking. Mexico sits closer to a high external-concentration model: North American manufacturing demand can lift exports quickly, but U.S. cyclical and trade-policy shocks also pass through rapidly. Brazil remains commodity-sensitive, yet its large domestic market and strong labor income in 2025 provided a stronger buffer. Both still share weak investment and productivity constraints. Mexico is placed toward the externally concentrated side because 83% of its 2025 exports went to the United States; Brazil is placed toward stronger domestic cushioning because low unemployment and real-income growth supported demand in 2025. These are period-specific positions, not permanent national identities. [30] [28] [19] [16]

The matrix is a structured synthesis rather than an econometric estimate. Exchange rates, fiscal choices, political shocks and a different commodity cycle could shift either country’s position. The value of the two-axis view is that it moves beyond the shorthand of manufacturing country versus commodity country and asks where a shock enters and what absorbs it. If investment, productivity or trade geography changes, the position of either economy can move. [40] [33] [21]

Conclusion: how to read the Mexico-Brazil growth gap

What the evidence establishes

The evidence firmly shows that recent Mexico-Brazil growth differences cannot be explained by export size alone. Mexico combined strong 2025 exports with an 83% U.S. destination share and weak domestic momentum, while Brazil paired 2.3% GDP growth with low unemployment and rising real earnings that supported internal demand. [30] [2] [28]

What depends on future conditions

Which economy grows faster next depends on U.S. manufacturing demand and trade policy, China and commodity prices, domestic interest rates and fiscal settings, and whether industrial policies turn announced projects into productive capital. Successful nearshoring investment in Mexico or lower transaction costs from Brazil’s tax reform could materially change the current pattern. [33] [11] [39]

What remains unresolved

What remains uncertain is the exact causal contribution of nearshoring to Mexican GDP and the exact share of Brazilian growth attributable to the commodity cycle. Estimating those effects requires matched industry and regional investment data, real exchange rates, detailed trade flows and a credible counterfactual rather than headline correlations. [19] [32] [23]

The most defensible reading is that Mexico’s heavy exposure to U.S. manufacturing demand and Brazil’s stronger domestic cushion in 2025 interacted with different policy and financing conditions. Mexico clearly retains an export advantage, but infrastructure, investment and domestic-demand constraints can weaken the translation from exports to GDP. Brazil remains commodity-sensitive, yet labor income and consumption can absorb part of an external shock. Over time, productivity gains and realized capital formation are more likely to determine the durable gap than the labels of nearshoring or commodity boom. [16] [30] [28] [8]

Sources and methods

The analysis prioritizes official national accounts, labor, merchandise-trade, external-debt and investment statistics, supplemented by comparable IMF, World Bank, OECD and WTO material. When sources overlap, the definition and reference date come before the headline number. Forecasts are separated from realized data, stocks from flows, and nominal measures from real growth. The links below are the principal public sources supporting the analysis.

• [2] IBGE: PIB cresce 2,3% em 2025 e fecha o ano em R$ 12,7 trilhões
• [5] International Monetary Fund: Mexico: 2025 Article IV Consultation — Staff Report
• [6] International Monetary Fund: Brazil: 2025 Article IV Consultation — Staff Report
• [9] Presidencia de la República, México: Plan México — investment portfolio of US$277 billion
• [11] Receita Federal do Brasil: Brazil Consumption Tax Reform — main regulatory milestones
• [13] Office of the U.S. Trade Representative: Mexico Trade Summary — NAFTA and USMCA history
• [14] World Trade Organization: WTO Trade Policy Review — Mexico 2022
• [15] World Trade Organization: WTO Trade Policy Review — Brazil 2022
• [16] OECD / ECLAC / CAF / European Commission: Latin American Economic Outlook 2025
• [19] Bank for International Settlements: Evidence of nearshoring in the Americas?
• [20] OECD: OECD Economic Surveys: Mexico 2024
• [21] International Monetary Fund: IMF Staff Completes 2026 Article IV Visit to Brazil
• [23] International Monetary Fund: External Debt Statistics: Guide for Compilers and Users
• [24] International Monetary Fund: Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, Sixth Edition
• [25] OECD: OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment
• [26] Banco de México: Monetary policy announcements — target rate
• [28] IBGE: PNAD Contínua — 2025 annual labour market results
• [29] Banco Central do Brasil: Relatório de Política Monetária — June 2025
• [30] Secretaría de Economía, México: Mexico 2025 exports reached a historical record
• [32] Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services, Brazil: Brazil Foreign Trade Consolidated Results
• [33] OECD: Harnessing nearshoring opportunities in Mexico
• [34] Banco de México: Mexico International Investment Position and Gross External Debt Position in 2025
• [37] Banco Central do Brasil: Brazil external debt revision — public and private sectors
• [39] World Bank: Commodity Markets Outlook — April 2026
• [40] World Bank: Latin America and the Caribbean Economic Review — October 2025
• [42] Banco Central do Brasil: BCB publishes the 2025 Annual Report